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Therefore, the tendency to blame the international community on its failures is not particularly useful. For example, Jan
Oberg states that "The extremely counterproductive European and U.S. handling of former Yugoslavia has aggravated the
original situation almost beyond the point of recognition. They turned a situation from bad to worse and have no moral right to
set things right with or against any party"; see his "Conflict Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia", 1994, Rober Elias & Jennifer
Turpin, Rethinking Peace. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 145-46. Such a conclusion implies, probably mistakenly, that without
the international political and military presence the conflict would have been resolved or at least its escalation avoided by local
efforts.
See, e.g., Flora Lewis, 1995, "Reassembling Yugoslavia". Foreign Policy, no. 98, pp. 132-44.
The importance of identity and entitlements in ethnic politics is stressed in Raimo Vayrynen, 1994, "Towards a Theory of
Ethnic Conflicts and their Resolution". Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Occasional
PaperOP:8:2, pp. 5-8, 14-19.
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While many territorial, political and legal issues remain
unresolved, there seems to be finally an opportunity to create
a more stable peace in Southern Eastern Europe. This
opportunity has emerged primarily as a result of military
developments on which international political efforts by the
United Nations, the European Union and especially the United
States to resolve disputes have been based. The recent history
of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia suggests that neither
political nor military actions alone can settle an intractable
conflict, but an appropriate and acceptable combination of
them both is needed.
The interdependence of military and political actions
should be retained, but in a reversed form, in the transition
from war to peace. This means that the objective should be a
principled, negotiated peace which will mitigate the causes of
violence and constrain the capabilities of the parties to return
to the use of military force. In other words, an overarching
political strategy, comprising both national and international
efforts, should guide the peace process. This strategy should
be based on a single vision; the establishment in the region of
a stable peace by means of peaceful, mutually beneficial
interstate relations. If the parties do not share this vision, the
diplomatic endgame of peace negotiations wi II hardly produce
lasting results.
The role of the international community is pivotal; it
is unrealistic to think that without it a workable peace in the
former Yugoslavia can be created. True, both the OSCE, the
European Union and the United Nations, and their member
states, failed to prevent the outbreak and escalation of violence
and may have by their hesitant, stop-and-go policies
contributed to its deterioration. However, without the
international diplomatic efforts and the peace enforcement by
NATO, based on a UN mandate, in the final phases of the
conflict, the protracted violence would most likely continue.
On balance, the role of international community in former
Yugoslavia has been both necessary and useful.' On the other
hand, one should not be blind to unilateral interests, sometimes
at crosspurposes with each other, that the permanent members
of the UN Security Council have in the region.
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This policy paper argues that the wares) in the former
Yugoslavia can be resolved only if normal interstate relations
can be established between Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. In a
larger context this principle should be applied to at least
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia. This model of
interstate relations deviates, for example, from proposals which
aim to restore the old Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) in a looser,
con federal form."
Naturally the political and diplomatic relations between
the new states in the former Yugoslavia must be underpinned
by economic cooperation, arms limitation, solid constitutional
arrangements as well as adequate and credible minority rights.
The achievement of these goals requires long-term
commitments; without them efforts at a stable peace are bound
to be futile. Naturally, such goals can be criticized for being
too rational or idealistic, but the fact remains that the approval
of these general goals, rather than the distribution of guilt and
the feelings of vengeance, should inform the political processes
towards peace.
Naturally, the reaching of these goals will not be easy,
and they may even contradict each other. Especially vexing
are the relations between the recognition of states'
independence and their borders, the principle of self-
determination and the effective protection of minority rights.
Because in the former Yugoslavia self-determination has been
granted on the basis of established republic and provincial
borders, the minority rights and their protection gain particular
urgency. Otherwise massive movements of people, topping
the ethnic cleansing during the war, would be needed to
achieve the correspondence between territory and ethnic
identity.
Although social and ethnic identities are not an item
on the negotiation agenda, they are a key issue in the peace
process in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover they are
interlinked; the satisfaction of the identity needs is associated
with entitlements, the right of people to employment, income,
land, housing and other socio-economic titles but also to
democratic and human rights." In the Balkans a mixture of
identities is especially pronounced. Historically, religion,
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imposed by the outside empires, has been the key criterion
of identity. During the second half of the 19th century the
emerging nationalism and the competition for material
entitlements helped in Bosnia to convert Catholics into
Croats and Orthodox into Serbs, starting to yearn for an
association with Croatia and Serbia, respectively. In this
process of transformation the Bosnian Muslims were left
without a clear national identity, the construction of which
has only recently been started."
The historical experiences in the Balkans seem to
revolve around one important imperative; try to avoid a
minority status within a state as it spells disaster to you,
especially during the periods of turmoi 1.5As a result, you
have to seek for shelter by seceding from the state ruled
by an alien majority and associating with your ethnic ilk.
Unless this syndrome, fostered both by genuine fears and
unfounded prejudices, can be alleviated, there is little hope
for a stable peace in the former Yugoslavia. In policy terms
this means that even though the 1991-95 war has resulted
in much more pure ethnic states, the principles of
multiculturalism and minority right cannot be looked over
in the peace settlement.
The legacies of warfare
The relationship between Croatia and Serbia is the
key to both confl ict and cooperation in the former
Yugoslavia. The takeover by the Yugoslavian National
Army (JNA) ofKrajina and Eastern and Western Siavonia
in 1991-92 created a permanent territorial crisis between
them. To Croatia these territories were under foreign
occupation, temporarily under the UN supervision, while
to the Croatian Serbs they were the building blocs of a
new independent state which might one day join Serbia.
These positions were diametrically opposed and could not
be resolved by negotiation. Building peace from below,
within the communities is an important strategy for peace,"
but in an intractable conflict it can hardly function unless
there is stability created from above.
In 1991 the United Nations brokered a ceasefire
in Croatia, established the UNPROFOR and divided the
territories into four demilitarized zones. Such a situation
was unlikely to last and by the early 1995 it became obvious
that Croatia, which had systematically strengthened its
military muscle by purchasing weapons from Russia and
elsewhere, was prepared to use military force to regain
the territories. In May and August 1995 Croatia recovered
by the force of arms first Western Siavonia and then
Krajina. The position of oil-rich Eastern Siavonia remains
still open.
In Bosnia the Serbian attacks on the UN declared
safe havens, including Sarajevo, and the takeover
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Srebrenica and Zepa in summer 1995 prompted NATO,
under a mandate from the United Nations, to carry out
more than 4000 air strikes against the positions of Bosnian
Serbs. Weakened by these strikes and internal political
disputes and pressured by Belgrade, the Bosnian Serbs
finally agreed in September 1995 to withdraw their heavy
weapons behind the 20 kilometer exclusion zone around
Sarajevo.
The conventional wisdom is that the military
operations in 1995 have created a new political situation
in the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serbs have been
weakened, but not defeated. Th Muslim government has
enlarged its territorial control in Bosnia, but is not strong
enough to seek for a military settlement.
The clear winner in the military endgame has been
Croatia which has significantly strengthened its position
both within its own borders and in Bosnia. This has created
new tensions in the relations of the Croats both with the
Muslims and the Serbs. While hostilities continue, the
threat of a large-scale war has been thwarted, however,
by stopping the recent Croat-Muslim advances short of
conquering Banja Luka, the Serbian stronghold in
northern Bosnia.
The policy of the United States and the European
Union has consistently been that Bosnia, Croatia and
Serbia should be recognized within their established
borders. Now these states have reached these borders, with
the significant and difficult exceptions of Eastern Siavonia
and the distribution of territories between the parties to-
the Bosnian peace settlement. There are also potential
territorial disputes in other parts of the former Yugoslavia,
in particular in Kosovo and Macedonia.
It is pivotal that both of the problems of Eastern
Siavonia and the territorial division of Bosnia can be
resolved without further resort to military force. At the
same time an adequate legal and political basis has to be
created for stable future relations between the states in
the region. In this effort several political and legal
principles should be honored, pertaining to at least the
following issues; territorial divisions, arms limitations,
political institutions, minority rights, and economic
reconstruction and cooperation.
Territorial issues
The importance of territorial control can seen in
the nature of warfare in which the destruction of
multiethnic urban life by artillery and sniper fire and the
elimination by murder and imprisonment of young male
as potential soldiers gained a notorious role. The siege of
Sarajevo and the conquest of and military pressure on the
UN declared safe havens by the Bosnian Serbs provide
The processes of identity transformation in Bosnia are historically traced by Robert J. Donia & John V.A. Fine, 1994, Bosnia
and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. London: C. Hurst & Co.
S This attitude is underpinned by strong historical myths specifying and sustaining strong enemy images between Croats,
Serbs and Bosnian Muslims; see especially Paul Mojzes, 1994, Yugoslavian Inferno. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans. New
York: Continuum.
6 For such a proposal for Western Slavonia, see "An Experimental Peacebuilding Zone in Western Slavonia. Peace form the
Ground Up". Copenhagen: The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, 1995.
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concrete examples of this. On the other hand the Bosnian
government forces used safe heavens and the weapons-
exclusions zone around Sarajevo to prepare for military
operations against Ratko Mladic's Serb forces and derive
economic benefits from smuggling and the black market
operations."
The politics of territorial control is also visible in
the recent conquests of land by the Croatian-Muslim
federation in Western and Central Bosnia both because it
brought its share of the territory controlled close to 51
per cent and gave a bargaining chip to get back territory
around Sarajevo. On the other hand the military success
has created new tensions between the federated partners.
The Muslims feel that the Croats control too much of the
Bosnian territory (22 per cent) and that their own share
should be increased from 29 to 34 per cent. The Croatian
counterargument is that the expansion of their territorial
control is justified as they did most of the fighting.
The territorial map of Bosnia is naturally one of
the most complicated issues in the ongoing peace
negotiations. Probably different national groups should
have as compact territorial domains as possible to reduce
fears and make their political and economic administration
easier. The territorial coherence of national groups in
Bosnia would be desirable even if people have to be
transferred from one region to another.
To make Bosnia territorially viable and to underpin
the unity of the state, Sarajevo should be made its capital.
This means that the undivided, multi ethnic nature of the
city should be restored. However, the Muslims should
probably have, because of their numerical strength, a
strong say in the local administration. A critical and most
difficult issue is whether Gorazde should remain in the
Muslim control. This seems to be a likely outcome. One
possible solution would be aguid pro quo between Gorazde
and Sarajevo in which both cities would remain
multiethnic, but the influence of the Serbs in Gorazde
would be permitted to increase to compensate for the
Muslim power in Sarajevo.
In any case, the Muslims and Serbs in Gorazde
and Sarajevo should have unhindered access to each other.
The corridor at Brcko should be broadened to permit a
safe connection between the two parts of the Serbian-
dominated territories. In redrawing the ethnic map of
Bosnia the use of military force should be stopped
immediately and a ceasefire declared.
As mentioned earlier, today there is hardly any
other possibility than to build the official relations within
the former Yugoslavia on the basis of the emerging state
units. This principle leads to the conclusion that, in
addition to assuring the coherence of Bosnia, the Croatian
sovereignty over Eastern Siavonia should be restored by
a negotiated, peaceful arrangement instead of Croatia
capturing it by military means. The principle further
means that Zagreb does have no right to incorporate Croat-
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inhabited areas of Bosnia to itself. Although a somewhat
artificial creation of the Western powers, the Croat-
Muslim federation in Bosnia has to be kept together as its
dissolution would open the door to the dismemberment
of the entire Bosnia. Hence it is inadmissible until the
normalcy is restored to the country.
Similarly, Serbia should give up any plans to
integrate Republika Srpska into Serbia proper and it
should accept the return of Eastern Siavonia to the
sovereign sphere of Croatia. The Geneva Accord of
September 8, 1995 is quite clear in that regard: "Both
entities will have the right to establish parallel special
relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina"."
Arms limitation
Croatia and Serbia have acquired an increasing
amount of weapons to fight each other. Though the worst
is over, the eruption of fighting, especially in Eastern
Siavonia, cannot be entirely ruled out. In Bosnia the Croat-
Muslim forces, which have also their mutual tensions,
are standing against the Serb forces and in many places
tensions are tangible. Stable peace in the former
Yugoslavia is difficult to imagine without constraining
the size and employment of military forces.
Without going into technical details, it may suffice
to say that the military balance between Croatia and Serbia
has been heavily skewed in Serbia's favor, especially in
hardware such as tanks, artillery and air force which it
inherited from the JNA. During the last three years or so
the Croatian strive for rearmament on the one hand and
Serbia's deep economic problems on the other hand have
rectified the balance somewhat. In any case, it is clear
that a potential war between Croatia and Serbia would be
much more destructive than what we have seen in Bosnia.
The Serb forces in Western Siavonia and Krajina
were too weak to be able to provide a match for the
advancing Croatian forces which failed to get support from
Belgrade. In Bosnia, the military balance, which originally
favored the Serbs, has been shifting to the direction of the
Muslim government and especially the Croat forces. This
shift has been more visible in military manpower and
morale than in heavy weaponry, i.e. tanks, armored
personnel carriers and artillery, in which the Bosnian
Serbs still outnumber their adversaries as much as 8 to
1.9 Clearly, the Bosnian Serbs have been recently much
more on the defensive than in the earlier phases of the
war.
What can be done to alleviate military tensions in
the region? Croatia and Serbia should negotiate ceilings
on their military forces that would be consistent with the
principles of the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE). They should also start following the rules,
For further details, see, e.g. Charles Lane, 1995, "The Fall of Srebrenica". The New Republic, August 14, pp. 14-17 and
Charles A. Boyd, 1995, "Making Peace with the Guilty. The Truth about Bosnia". Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5, pp. 29-30.
8 I have followed the text of the Accord published in New York Times, September 9, 1995, p.4.
Fordetails, see The Military Balance 1994-95. London: IISS, pp. 83-87, 105-106. See also "The Military Balance in Bosnia
and Its Effects on the Prospects for Peace". Special Report. The United States Institute of Peace: Washington, D. C., August
1995. Understandably, some of its policy recommendations are somewhat outdated.
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principles and procedures agreed upon in various OSCE
documents concerning confidence- and security-building
measures (CSBMs). Their application would increase
information and openness and introduce mechanisms by
which potential emergencies can be handled. In general,
the reliance on the OSCE procedures would mean that
the Croatian-Serbian relations would gradually become
more normal and thus comparable with other interstate
relations in Europe. Naturally, military CSBMs should
be complemented by their non-military counterparts.
In Bosnia, the first task is to restore the monopoly
of military power to the hands of the government(s). It is
unrealistic to believe, at least in the short term, that a
unified Bosnian army could be set up. Therefore, the
military power should be concentrated in the first place
to the hands of the official bodies of the three national
groups. In the first phase cooperation between the Croat
and Muslim government forces should be improved and
in the second phase this process should be expanded to
the relations with the Serb troops. The disarmament of
the warlords would clarity the political responsibilities
and improve the centralized control of the armed forces.
To facilitate this control, the excess troops, and in
particular the heavy weapons, should be moved to specific
locations where they would be under the surveillance of
the international enforcement forces.
The borders between Bosnia's national regions
should be as open as possible and supervised by only lightly
armed patrols rather than by military forces. This
suggestion is consistent with the agreement reached at
the United Nations on September 26, 1995 in which, the
freedom of movement of the people in Bosnia is assured.'?
This agreement does not, however, deal yet with the role
and the relationship of various military forces in Bosnia
which is a sure sign that they are politically very contested
issues.
The external powers should refrain from arming
the parties to the Bosnian war. While military training
programs may be appropriate to increase the
professionalism and democratic control of the armies, the
extensive delivery of new arms would undermine the
negotiated peace process. It is estimated that the United
States might be ready to spend anywhere between $ 1 to 5
billion to train and rearm the Bosnian government
military." The decisions on issues like this are a yardstick
whether the United States will have a reasonably balanced
attitude towards the parties of the Bosnian crisis or whether
it opts to tilt the political and military balance in the favor
of the Croat-Muslim federation." The continued heavy
attack by the federation forces around Banja Luka suggest
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that the governments of Bosnia and Croatia count on the
U.S. support.
Minority rights
The multiethnic nature of the former Yugoslavia
has been largely destroyed by the war. The big question is
whether multiethnicity should be restored or whether
ethnically purer communities would make better
neighbors. Concretely, this raises questions about the
return of Croats to Eastern Siavonia, of Serbs to Kraj ina
and the complex resettlement of Croats, Muslims and
Serbs in Bosnia. The answer is difficult, but it seems
unavoidable that the contested territories in Croatia will
be ethnically more pure and in Bosnia the social
boundaries between three ethnic groups will be more
clearly demarcated than before the war.
This ethnic demarcation does not mean, however,
that the people should not have a right to return or that
the minority rights of the minorities should not be
respected. In fact the Framework Agreement recognizes
"the right of displaced persons to repossess their property
or receive just compensation". In Eastern Siavonia the
Croats seem to be ready to accept an arrangement that
would restore, after a transition period, the ethnic
composition that prevailed before -the war (43 per cent
Croats, 26 per cent Serbs and 15 per cent Hungarians).
However, a precondition for starting this transition process
is that the Serb soldiers will either leave or be disarmed."
The restoration of the ethnic balance solves only a
part of the problems. In addition, the respect for all the
basic human rights should be guaranteed. Self-
determination is associated with the territorial integrity
of the state, but they should be realized only in the
compliance with human rights and democratic norms."
Therefore, sovereignty cannot be an excuse for suppressing
human rights and democracy; to the contrary, in the
modern conception they reinforce each other. To achieve
this objective, the tight connection between the state and
the nation has to be relaxed. The territorial integrity of
the state can be retained, but new, flexible regimes can be
developed to affirm the pluralistic nature ofmultinational
societies. It is also possible to think in terms offunctional
territorial arrangements to soften sovereignty and improve
interethnic relations."
The plans for the peace in Bosnia contain several
references to human rights, mostly in the context of the
internationally monitored multiparty elections. Thus, the
Framework Agreement calls for the "protection of speech
10 The text of the FrameworkAccord is published in New York Times, September 27, 1995, p. A8 ..
t t Thomas E. Ricks, "Bosnia Talks Make Progress on Some Issues". Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1995, pp. A3-4.
12 A strong plea for a more knowledgeable and balanced U.S. policy in Bosnia is made l!y Boyd op.cit. 1995, pp. 22-38.
13 Florence Hartmann, "La Croatie offre un compromis sur la Siavonie orientale". l.e Monde, September 16, 1995, p. 2. It is
doubtful, however, that Croatia would accept the restoration of the prewar ethnic composition in Krajina.
14 Rein Mllerson, 1994, International Law, Rights and Politics. London: Rout/edge, pp. 58-64.
1S These possibilities are further explored in Gidon Gottlieb, 1993, Nation Against the State. New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts
and the Decline of Sovereignty. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. See also Vayrynen op. cit. 1994, pp. 26-29.
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and of the press ... and of all other internationally
recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower
the democratic election process". Over a short term the
human rights provisions of the agreements should be
monitored by the OSCE representatives. After the
transition to peace the only viable strategy is that the states
ratify appropriate human rights instruments and
incorporate them into their national legislation. Human
rights provisions should apply equally to all national
groups and be underpinned by arrangements that grant
reasonable autonomy to regions that are heavily populated
by the minorities.
These principles are easy to enunciate, but difficult
to implement, especially if they contradict the basic
interests of the parties involved. According to one observer,
"solutions to civil conflicts which grant special guarantees
to minorities almost always ask those minorities to accept
less than they want", while they often demand that "the
majority accept far less than it wants and, indeed, less
than it already has"." In Bosnia, no national group has a
majority and, therefore, compromises may be even more
difficult to make. That is why the integration of human
rights and democratic norms in other aspects of the peace
process and their international enforcement are
particularly important.
Political and constitutional issues
Democratic constitution and practices restrain the
resort to military force and mitigate tensions within and
between societies. Therefore, the newly independent states
of the former Yugoslavia should create electoral,
legislative and executive systems which comply with the
basic democratic standards and in which the opposition
has a fair chance to gain power. In Croatia and Serbia
there is no external enforcement of the democratic norms,
therefore it has to be done internally.
In Bosnia, the Framework Agreement contains
surprisingly specific provisions on the composition, tasks
and procedures of the multinational parliament, the
presidency and the constitutional court. The agreement
is much more scant on the composition and the powers of
the cabinet. It makes clear, though, that the tasks of these
institutions may be confined only to foreign policy and
they can be expanded only if a mutual agreement is
reached.
It is vital that the parliament, the cabinet and
presidency will develop basic standards and procedures
for the state of Bosnia. Standards can concern both civil
and human rights, economic legislation and
administrative coordination. It is clear that the Bosnian
Serbs, Croats and Muslims will in reality have an extensive
internal autonomy to decide on such issues as education,
religion and local administration. It would be
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counterproductive, however, if the relatively small,
underdeveloped and resource-poor Bosnia cannot create
a viable framework for economic exchange within and
across its own borders. The central government should
also have a limited capacity to collect taxes by which
common infrastructure and other necessary projects could
be financed.
Economic reconstruction
The economic reconstruction of wartorn societies
is a multifaceted challenge. It requires the demobilization
of soldiers, their retraining and integration with the
society. In addition, to the reconstruction of political
institutions, also the economy of a wartorn state is badly
in need of repair. The economy may have been damaged
by the sanctions, hyperinflation, unemployment and non-
market operations such as smuggling and black markets.
In addition, the economy may have become overly
dependent on the international flow of funds for
humanitarian relief and peacekeeping weakening local
self-reliance.
The most effective strategy for a long-term
reconstruction is the transition to a market economy which
also encourages cross border economic interaction and
mutual interdependence. One of the first priorities in all
the states of the former Yugoslavia is to draw up a realistic
economic strategy which sets the integration with the
world market as the main goal. Such a strategy cannot be
based on the protection of special domestic interests,
overvalued currencies or large-scale external borrowing.
Rather the objective should be a domestic production for
basic needs and the development of vigorous export
industries on the basis of the available resource
endowment.
However, international assistance is needed to help
to form the war to a peacetime economy. Especially in
Bosnia extensive international assistance, benefiting all
ethnic communities, is a necessity. In economic assistance
priority should, indeed, be given to Bosnia at the expense
of Croatia and Serbia. While in Bosnia the limited
deliveries of humanitarian relief, in particular to refugees
and displaced people, will be needed, the emphasis should
be on the rebuilding of the transportation and industrial
infrastructure in the manner that would permit the country
to function as a single economic entity.
Economic discipline in a crisis-ridden society is a
precondition for the future growth. The multilateral
financial institutions, such as the IMF, should avoid,
however, conditions that would stifle economic initiative,
increase social and regional disparities and, in the worst
case contradict the international support to Bosnia's
reconstruction. •
Benjamin Schwarz, 1995, "The Diversity Myth: America 's Leading Export". The Atlantic Monthly, May, p. 65.
